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1. Introduction
The distinction between “thick” and “thin” terms and concepts and
its philosophical significance has been an active topic in ethics, and
increasingly in aesthetics and epistemology. Concepts commonly re-
garded as thick in ethics include generous, courageous, cruel, and
greedy, those commonly regarded as thin include many concepts ex-
pressed by terms like good and bad or right and wrong. What is sup-
posed to be distinctive about thick terms and concepts relative to
the thin is that they somehow “hold together” evaluation and non-
evaluative description, whereas thin terms and concepts are somehow
more purely evaluative.1 I can convey a negative evaluation of a bully’s
actions by calling them cruel or by calling them bad. Such judgments
differ with respect to description. Even if taking enjoyment in causing
others to suffer is both cruel and bad, the term cruel seems to entail
by its very meaning that things falling under it to have some non-
evaluative features of this general sort, whereas bad doesn’t. Some bad
things involve no enjoyment in the suffering of others. This contrast
will remain even if these non-evaluative features aren’t fully specified
in an analysis of a thick term or concept (it might not be a purely con-
ceptual matter just which preferences for one’s own happiness over a
greater happiness for others count as selfish) but the meaning of the
term or concept merely restricts them to a certain general type (kind
doesn’t admit of people who are disposed to respond to others in cold
or exploitative ways).
The distinction between thick and thin terms and concepts raises
important issues of formulation.2 This paper largely brackets those is-
1. Or normative, insofar as there is any clear distinction. It will be harmless
here to include the normative under the evaluative. I’ll use small caps to
denote concepts and italics to denote words and sentences.
2. One issue is how to explicate the contrast. Existing accounts, such as
Williams (1985), Gibbard (1992), or Dancy (1995), don’t adequately distin-
guish the thick from the thin in anything like a theoretically non-committal
way (see Eklund forthcoming). Another issue is the status of the contrast.
The distinction may mark some kind of difference of degree along a spec-
trum of concepts rather than a binary distinction in kind (Scheffler 1987:
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sues. I’ll simply assume that thick terms and concepts bear conceptual,
analytic, or semantic connections to non-evaluative features of at least
a certain general type: giving of oneself in the case of generous, taking
enjoyment in causing others to suffer in the case of cruel, and so on.
My interest in this paper lies rather in the relationship between thick
terms and concepts and evaluation. No doubt there is an important
sense in which the bully wouldn’t understand what the angry parents
of his victims try to communicate when they say that bullying is cruel,
if he failed to grasp the kind of negative evaluation which they mean
to convey. Just what kind of failure this would manifest depends on
how thick terms and concepts are related to evaluation.
This question about the relationship between thick concepts and
evaluation may be formulated as follows:
Location of Evaluation (LE): How are thick terms and concepts
related to the evaluations they may be used to convey?
By ‘evaluations’ I mean information or contents that are evaluative, not
mental acts of evaluation. LE thus asks how calling something gener-
ous or cruel, for instance, conveys evaluative information when it does
so. I also assume that evaluation is somehow positive or negative in
flavor. One, possibly controversial, way to explicate this is to say that
evaluative information concerns the merit or worth of something or
someone against some kind of standards.3 Things that compare favor-
ably relative to a particular standard are good in a certain way, and
bad in a certain way if they compare unfavorably. I’ll use ‘convey’ as
an umbrella term such different modes of information transfer as se-
mantic content and entailment, implicature, and presupposition.
The standard answer to LE is that thick terms and concepts are
417). Even such paradigmatic thin concepts as those expressed by ought in
moral contexts may be thick to some degree, insofar as S ought to φ entails
the non-evaluative modal claim S can φ.
3. Part of this thought derives from Williams (1985: 125). For a more careful
stage setting in this and other respects, see Väyrynen (ms1).
inherently evaluative in their very meaning. Their relationship to eval-
uation is conceptual, analytic, or semantic in the same sort of way as
their relationship to description.4 Some evaluation, such as that things
falling under generous are good in some way related to giving of one-
self, belongs to the very meaning of generous as much as do such gen-
eral type descriptions as that those things involve giving of oneself.5
The natural alternative is to say that evaluation isn’t a feature of what
thick terms and concepts mean, but rather a feature of what thinkers
or speaker-hearers may use them to mean, may associate with their
meanings, glean from their uses, and so on.6 (When ‘meaning’ occurs
by itself in what follows, it refers specifically to semantic meaning,
not speaker meaning.) On the standard view the bully we imagined is
defective already in his competence with respect to meaning or con-
ceptual content. (Perhaps what happens is that he fails to grasp the
sense under which more virtuous people see cruel things or what the
truth of the sentence Bullying is cruel requires.) On the alternative view,
the bully is morally flawed but his mistake needn’t involve conceptual
confusion or semantic error.
The aim of this paper is not to answer LE either way. Its aim is
rather to show that, contrary to what many philosophers have thought,
LE cannot be settled on the basis of whether thick terms and concepts
are contextually variable with respect to the valence of the evaluations
they may be used to convey. (For brevity, I’ll write about variability
‘in evaluative valence’ or ‘in the direction of evaluation’ from now on.)
In what follows, I’ll first describe the relevant sort of variability more
clearly to indicate how it has been thought to bear on LE. I’ll then
consider two kinds of examples which have been used to support an
argument from contextual variability against semantic views about the
4. See e.g. Foot (1958), Platts (1979: Ch. 10), McDowell (1979; 1981), Williams
(1985), Dancy (1995), Putnam (2002: Ch. 2), and Elstein and Hurka (2009).
5. A related view is that evaluation is some such further semantic property of
thick terms and concepts as conventional implicature.
6. See e.g. Hare (1952; 1981), Blackburn (1992; 1998), and Väyrynen (2009).
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relationship between thick terms and concepts and evaluation. I’ll ar-
gue that the first kind of examples fail to support the sort of contextual
variability which this argument requires. And I’ll argue that the sec-
ond kind of examples fail to settle LE even if they support the relevant
sort of variability, because several different hypotheses regarding LE
can account for them. The conclusion I draw is therefore a kind of null
result: attempts to settle LE on the basis of considerations of contextual
variability in evaluative valence are bound to fail and LE must there-
fore be settled on some other grounds instead. I’ll close by suggesting
a more promising line of future inquiry.
2. The Variability Argument
What does it mean to say that thick terms and concepts are contex-
tually variable in evaluative valence? A theoretically fairly neutral but
(therefore?) rough formulation is that brutal, for instance, is variable in
valence if it can be used to evaluate things negatively in some contexts
but positively in others – if utterances of sentences of the form X is
brutal convey sometimes that X is bad in some way but at other times
that X is good in some way.7 This formulation allows that thick terms
and concepts may typically convey evaluations of a particular valence
even if their valence is contextually variable. Calling something cruel
or insensitive typically conveys something negative, calling something
generous or wise typically conveys something positive.
Apparent contextual variability in evaluative valence has mainly
been used to argue against the view that thick terms and concepts are
inherently evaluative in meaning. Such views require that sentences
or propositions involving thick terms and concepts analytically entail
evaluation. The main idea behind arguments from contextual variabil-
ity is that one should find it hard to see how that could be so if the
evaluations that thick terms and concepts may be used to convey were
7. The latter might be a natural interpretation of an utterance that pleads
“Don’t change this beautiful and brutal game.” (Thanks to Remy Debes for
this example from a discussion of concussion risks in American football.)
positive in some contexts but negative or even neutral in others.8
The main support for positing variability in evaluative valence
comes from various sorts of examples. These examples, as we’ll see,
move at the level of language. Thus arguments built on them presume
that linguistic evidence concerning thick terms bears on the nature of
thick concepts. I’ll understand concepts in the common way in terms
of their theoretical function to explain phenomena of cognitive signif-
icance. (In one familiar terminology, this locates concepts closer to the
realm of sense or modes of representation rather than reference. We
also know that linguistic meaning isn’t to be equated with reference.)
It seems to be fairly common in the literature on thick concepts to as-
sume that the meanings of thick terms are more or less the same as the
concepts they express. This hides potential complications insofar as the
relationship between language and concepts is complex and controver-
sial.9 But all that I’ll need to assume about linguistic meaning is that
aspects of the meaning of an expression must be stable at least across
its literal uses in normal contexts. Such constraints on uses across con-
texts also seem relevant to individuating concepts; one would expect
them at least to constrain the concepts that thick terms may be inter-
preted as expressing. I’ll continue to speak of thick terms and concepts
in one breath with this contact point in mind.
Variability arguments of the kind described above can be broken
down to two main premises. One states the claim of contextual vari-
ability, typically supported by examples. The other makes a claim
about how contextual variability bears on the relationship between
thick terms and concepts and evaluation. The following “Variability
Argument” is an argument of this general form:
(V1) Variability Claim: Thick terms and concepts are contextually
8. Compare standard examples of analytic truths: it cannot be that a bachelor
sometimes is eligible to marry but sometimes isn’t, or that being red all
over sometimes excludes being green all over but sometimes doesn’t.
9. The relationship between language and concepts may not be straightfor-
ward if, for instance, concepts are more fine-grained than the sorts of enti-
ties that semantics assigns as the meanings of expressions.
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variable in evaluative valence.
(V2) Link Claim: If thick terms and concepts are contextually vari-
able in evaluative valence, then the evaluations that they may
be used to convey don’t belong to their meanings.
(V3) Therefore, the evaluations that thick terms and concepts may
be used to convey don’t belong to their meanings; they are
rather a feature of pragmatics.
Both premises of this argument require clarification.
The Link Claim in (V2) is to be understood as sufficiently generic
with respect to ‘meaning’ to rule out any view according to which
thick terms and concepts are inherently evaluative. Different versions
of such views will render the notion more precise beyond the con-
straints already indicated. (One might claim that the relevant mean-
ings are senses or some other (perhaps less fine-grained) entities that
determine semantic value. Or one might claim that they are some such
further semantic properties as conventional implicatures.) Thus one
way to resist the Variability Argument is to agree that thick terms and
concepts display genuine contextual variability in evaluative valence
but argue that the relationship between thick terms and concepts and
evaluation could be semantic and yet allow for such variability.10
The Variability Claim in (V1) is to be understood as allowing that
many thick terms and concepts are typically used to convey evalua-
tions of a particular valence. It is one thing to acknowledge that this
is how thick terms and concepts typically work, quite another to in-
fer that evaluations with that (or any) valence belong to its meaning.
Such regularity might be enforced by something other than meaning.11
10. Dancy (1995) advances an inseparabilist (see below) version of such a view.
But as we’ll see in §5.3, this option is more general. As we’ll see in §5.1, there
also seem to be ways of arguing from (V1) to (V3) which don’t require (V2).
But at least Blackburn (1992) accepts (V2).
11. It is, similarly, one thing to acknowledge that cruel or selfish, for instance, are
typically used to convey a negative evaluation even if the speaker doesn’t
intend this, quite another to infer that such evaluations belong to their
meaning. Pragmatic meanings can be “generalized” to the extent that they
are part of a defeasible default interpretation.
(V1) is also to be understood as saying that if cruel, for instance, is
typically used to convey negative evaluations through whatever mech-
anism, then it can sometimes be used to convey positive evaluations
through the same kind of mechanism. This qualification is meant to
rule out cases where a thick term or concept is used to convey eval-
uations whose valence differs from the typical only thanks to non-
literal use or conveys no evaluation because it is used non-evaluatively
merely to classify things. (A historian might report that the cruel and
unjust practices of a regime provoked rebellion without thereby evalu-
ating the regime.)
These two qualifications to (V1) are related. Some evaluations
whose valence differs from the typical seem to move at a different
level from the typical. Suppose, for instance, that deceitful is typically
used to convey that something is bad in some way but can be used
to convey that it is good in some way. At least sometimes such a pos-
itive evaluation seems to be a mere conversational implicature to the
effect that deceitfulness is good for helping secure what one wants,
or winning a reality TV show, or the like. If this were the only sort
of mechanism for using deceitful to convey positive evaluation and if
deceitful conveyed negative evaluation through some different mecha-
nism (perhaps in virtue of its meaning), then the evaluations would
move at different levels in the relevant sense. The notion of contex-
tual variability in (V1) is to be understood as ruling out such impor-
tant asymmetries between negatively and positively evaluative uses of
thick terms and concepts. Thus another way to resist the Variability
Argument is to argue that putative examples of contextual variability
in fact involve such an asymmetry or otherwise fail to speak to EQ.
The bulk of this paper is devoted to discussing two sorts of examples
of variability in valence which figure in the literature on thick concepts
as support for the Variability Argument.
Variability in direction of evaluation is often invoked in debates
between “separabilists” and “inseparabilists” which occupy much of
the literature. This debate concerns whether thick terms and concepts
are some kind of irreducible fusions of evaluation and description or
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whether these two aspects can be separated or “disentangled” in some
way.12 Broadly pragmatic views on the relationship between thick
terms and concepts and evaluation suggest that some kind of sepa-
rability will be possible, since they treat evaluation and description as
bearing different relations to thick terms and concepts. Thus it is no
accident that the Variability Argument is meant to apply against the
sorts of inseparabilist views which one typically finds in the literature.
Presumably the thought is that it would be difficult to explain how
thick terms and concepts could be contextually variable in evaluative
valence if evaluation and description were inseparable.
The Variability Argument is more general, however. However well
it works against inseparabilists, it should work equally well (or badly)
against those separabilists who think that thick terms and concepts
have a semantically fixed direction of evaluation which is separable
from description. So, while the Variability Argument is geared at LE
(since it targets the hypothesis that thick terms and concepts are inher-
ently evaluative in meaning), the issue of separability lies downstream
from LE (because such views could be either separabilist or insepara-
bilist).13 The issue regarding (V2) whether thick terms and concepts
could exhibit genuine contextual variability if they were inherently
evaluative in meaning can similarly be pursued along either separa-
bilist or inseparabilist lines.14 Thus, although the issue of separability
has some relevance to the Variability Argument, it doesn’t provide the
most general conceptual frame for assessing how exactly that argu-
ment bears on LE.
12. Separabilists include Hare (1952: 121-2; 1981: 17-8, 73-5), Blackburn (1992;
1998: 101ff.), and Elstein and Hurka (2009). Inseparabilists include McDow-
ell (1979; 1981), Platts (1979: Ch. 10), Williams (1985: 129-30, 140-1), Dancy
(1995), Wiggins (1998), Putnam (2002: Ch. 2), and Kirchin (2010). As the
metaphorical character of how these views are characterized perhaps sug-
gests, the semantic, metaphysical, and epistemic properties of this relation
of (in)separability are often unclear.
13. Whether pragmatic views entail separabilism depends on such general is-
sues as whether there is “pragmatic intrusion” into semantic content.
14. See notes 25 and 27 below.
3. Variability and Comparative Constructions
One argument for the Variability Claim is based on examples like the
following:
(1) ‘[T]idy’ and ‘industrious’ . . . are normally used to commend;
but we can say, without any hint of irony, ‘too tidy’ or ‘too
industrious.’ (Hare 1952: 121.)
(2) [We may] worry that this year’s Carnival was not lewd
enough. (Blackburn 1992: 296.)
It is clear from context that these examples are meant to support some-
thing like the Variability Claim introduced above.15 Hare explicitly
takes his example to be a case of literal use to convey negative evalua-
tion. Blackburn takes his example to be a case of literal use to convey
that the carnival would have been better had it been more lewd, so
that lewd conveys positive evaluation instead of the typical negative
one. But what is the argument? I’ll now argue that two natural routes
from examples involving such constructions as too and not ... enough to
the Variability Claim won’t work.
One option is to claim that the evaluative valence of too tidy and not
lewd enough is determined in some way that requires tidy and lewd to
have contextually variable valence as well. But in fact the way modi-
fiers like too and not ... enough work in general explains how the former
constructions may flip the evaluative valence of their unmodified roots
without the latter having to be variable in valence.
Constructions of the forms too F and not F enough are compara-
tive. There is broad consensus that determining what they say requires
some kind of standard of comparison. Such a standard can be either
set implicitly by the context of utterances of sentences like (3) and (4)
or fixed explicitly by devices which can serve to supply a standard.
Examples include the to- and for-phrases in (3a-b) and (4a-b):
15. Thick terms and concepts are often assumed to be sufficiently uniform for
examples to generalize across the board. Such uniformity assumptions are
dubious, but I’ll bracket the issue here.
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(3) Michael is too industrious.
a. Michael is too industrious to have time to visit Bordeaux
wineries.
b. Michael is too industrious for me to read all his work.
(4) The party isn’t loud enough.
a. The party isn’t loud enough to keep the neighbors awake.
b. The party isn’t loud enough for Simon.
Some people think that utterances of sentences like (3) and (4) can ex-
press complete propositions without any implicit or explicit standard
being supplied. This would effectively be to claim that one can be too
industrious, period, or not loud enough, period. But if there is any-
thing to say about what kind of criticism such an utterance is meant
to express, then some kind of standard will be at least implicit in the
answer. In the case of industrious, the standard might concern, for in-
stance, the shape of a balanced life, the time and attention due to one’s
family, or the like. The standard needn’t be a moral or prudential one,
though. Semantics will admit any respect in which degrees of a quality
such as industriousness may be compared. (It will also admit different
views on what sort of property is thereby measured.)
How these comparative constructions work could be analyzed in
great detail by drawing on the standard degree-based semantics for
gradable expressions.16 But some basic points will suffice here. The
standard of comparison determines upper and lower bounds of ad-
missibility on a scale associated with the word, such as the scale of
industriousness in (3) or the scale of loudness in (4). Depending on
the polarity of the modified expression, too F places an F either above
the upper bound of the interval (e.g., too expensive on the dimension of
cost) or below its lower bound (e.g., too young on the dimension of age),
and analogously for not F enough (consider not cheap enough and not old
16. See e.g. Creswell (1977), Klein (1980), von Stechow (1984), Schwarzschild
and Wilkinson (2002), Meier (2003), Kennedy (2007), and Glanzberg (2007).
enough). (3) and (4) can thus be analyzed as follows:
(3’) The value Michael takes on a scale of industriousness is
greater than the maximum admissible value determined by
context c.
(4’) The value the party takes on a scale of loudness is lower than
the minimum admissible value determined by context c.
So when (3) means (3a), it says something like this: Michael’s degree
of industriousness is greater than the maximum degree d such that if
Michael’s degree of industriousness is (no greater than) d, then he has
time to visit Bordeaux wineries.
What the examples under (3) and (4) show is that the standard for
counting as satisfying too F or not F enough is typically neither the same
as the standard for satisfying F nor determined by the same factors. A
party might count as satisfying loud, but be less noisy than would be
required to keep the neighbors awake or to keep Simon around (not
loud enough), and yet be more noisy than is safe for hearing or com-
fortable for infants (too loud). This a perfectly general point about how
these modifiers work. There is no reason why the standards of com-
parison they invoke should have any implications for whether thick
terms and concepts have variable valence in unmodified form.
Another option is to claim that if tidy were inherently a term of posi-
tive evaluation, or lewd inherently a negative one, criticizing something
as too tidy or not lewd enough shouldn’t be semantically permissible.
More of a positive quality, or less of a negative one, should hardly be
a bad thing. Since it seems perfectly coherent to criticize something by
calling it too tidy or not lewd enough, tidy and lewd should be regarded
as contextually variable rather than semantically fixed in their evalu-
ative valence.17 Another way of putting this idea is that if counting
as tidy were inherently good in some way and counting as lewd were
inherently negative in some way, then it would be difficult to explain
17. This argument was suggested to me (but not endorsed) by Daniel Elstein
(p.c.). Blackburn (1992: 286) may have something similar in mind.
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how too tidy and not lewd enough could invert the evaluative valence of
their unmodified roots as they do.
This argument also fails to appreciate how modifiers like too and
not ... enough work. Calling something too tidy or not lewd enough can
be semantically permissible even if tidiness is an inherently positive
quality or lewdness an inherently negative one, because too F and not
F enough take a standard of comparison which, as we saw, is typically
neither the same as the standard for satisfying F nor determined by
the same factors. Something can count as too F relative to some con-
textually determined purpose or standard even if more of Fness is
better so far as the standard for counting as F is concerned. A military
commander can perfectly well count a soldier as too courageous for a
camouflage mission for which cowards are suitable and select him for
the real mission because he is very courageous indeed.
It is also worth noting that if the argument works, it may apply
more broadly than one might have thought. Thin terms and concepts
seem to work in the same way in the relevant comparative construc-
tions so far as semantic permissibility goes. A wine can be said to be
too good to be used for cooking (or dyeing clothes, or whatever) even if
the degree of goodness which makes it so relative to that standard also
makes it better as a wine or makes drinking it a better state of affairs.
Satan in a career slump can regard his activities as not (morally) bad
enough for a satisfactorily Satanic job performance even if those ac-
tivities still clearly qualify as (morally) bad.18 In general, the standard
for counting as satisfying too good or not bad enough is also typically
neither the same as the standard for satisfying good or bad nor deter-
mined by the same factors. But if the above argument then generalized
to show that good and bad also lack a semantically fixed direction of
evaluation, it couldn’t be used to show that thick terms and concepts
18. Whether the distinction between “attributive” and “predicative” uses of
good complicates examples in this vein is unclear. Some argue that (surface
grammar aside) good is uniformly predicative but context-sensitive with
respect to a standard (Szabó 2001). Nor does that distinction undermine
the similarity noted next in the text between thick and thin terms.
in particular are variable in valence. The possibility that thick and thin
terms and concepts might both be contextually variable in valence is
tangential to my present aims. Such parity claims would in any case
require independent support beyond the examples of apparent vari-
ability presently on the table.
It is also no accident that those who defend the Variability Claim
with examples like (1) and (2) never bring up thin counterparts of such
examples. Many philosophers wouldn’t or (given their other views)
couldn’t welcome the result that thin terms and concepts are contextu-
ally variable in their evaluative valence.19
This explanation of why the two arguments from too and not ...
enough to the Variability Claim fail also handles examples like (5):
(5) I found this year’s carnival lewd – just think of all those peo-
ple, almost naked, dancing in that sexually suggestive way
on the main street. And yet the carnival wasn’t lewd enough.
An utterance of (5) needn’t be contradictory. Even prudes can accept
that an occasional opportunity for a socially permissible transgression
of conventional boundaries on sexual display has a valuable social
function to serve. As Blackburn puts it, carnivals can serve this kind of
social function as “necessary eruptions of the Dionysiac into the frag-
ile Apollonian order” (1992: 296). An utterance of (5) can be perfectly
appropriate in certain contexts of utterance. A carnival can count as
lewd, as the first half of (5) registers, but not sufficiently so for it to
satisfy this social function, which is what the second half of (5) can
express in a suitable context. This is fully explicable in terms of how
the relevant modifiers work in general.
I conclude that the Variability Claim cannot be established on the
basis of how thick terms and concepts behave under modifiers like too
19. In particular, Hare cannot allow that good is contextually variable in its
use as what he calls a “primarily evaluative” term (Hare 1952: Ch. 7). And
Blackburn cannot allow that good varies with respect to whether it expresses
pro-attitudes or con-attitudes, since these play different roles in guiding
desires and choices (Blackburn 1993: 137, 168).
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and not ... enough. But it would be natural to wonder whether these
comparative constructions are required to get examples of apparent
variability in valence going. I’ll now turn to discuss whether the Vari-
ability Claim could be supported by examples involving thick terms
and concepts in unmodified positive form.
4. Variability in the Positive Form?
Another argument for the Variability Claim is based on examples
where a simple predication of a thick term or concept appears to be
used to convey an evaluation whose valence differs from those it is
typically used to convey:
(6) The carnival was a lot of fun. But something was missing. It
just wasn’t lewd. I hope it’ll be lewd next year. (Eklund, p.c.)
(7) A previous Master of my Oxford College was condemned as
frugal, a fatal flaw in someone whose main job is dispensing
hospitality. (Blackburn 1992: 286.)
(8) Wiping a sweaty torturer’s brow can be considerate. But it
might not be the better for it, and hardly functions as a reason
to wipe. (Dancy 2009: §6.)20
(9) We can say ‘Yes, cruel certainly, but that’s just what made it
such fun.’ (Hare 1981: 73.)
These examples raise two sorts of issues. One is whether the evalu-
ations that the utterances they report are used to convey are correct.
The second is whether those utterances are semantically permissible.
These issues are distinct. It might, for instance, be mistaken to deny
that considerate things are always better for it in some way, at least
to some small degree. Such denials might nonetheless be semantically
permissible. What matters to LE are the latter sort of facts.
There is no obvious need for anyone to deny that thick terms and
concepts can sometimes be used in unmodified form somehow to con-
vey evaluations whose valence differs from the typical. What matters
20. For other examples in this vein, see Swanton (2001: 48).
to LE are the mechanisms by which those evaluations would be con-
veyed. Thus uttering (6) can somehow convey that next year’s carnival
would be better in some way if it were lewd. (7) reports that some-
times – as in the case of Blackburn’s college master, call him ‘Tweedy’
– frugal can be used somehow to convey criticism rather than praise.
(8) claims that considerate can be used without conveying anything pos-
itive or even to convey negative evaluation (e.g., to criticize someone
for facilitating a torturer’s evil purpose). And (9) can sometimes be
read as agreeing that an action counts as satisfying cruel but take that
as recommending it, perhaps even without any obvious tint of sadism.
These examples support the Variability Argument only insofar as they
involve using thick terms or concept to convey one direction of eval-
uation by the same sort of mechanisms as they are (typically) used to
convey a different direction of evaluation.
A satisfactory account of examples likes these should account also
for certain variants, such as the following sorts of variants of (7):
(10) A: Tweedy is frugal.
B: Yes, but the claret is abundant and fine.
(11) C: Tweedy is frugal.
D: Yes, the claret is worse than before and there isn’t enough
of it for us to stop caring.
Sometimes when A’s utterance in (10) occurs in a discussion of
Tweedy’s job performance, B’s reply should be able to sound fine. If
A is conveying a negative evaluation of Tweedy’s hospitality in call-
ing him frugal, sometimes B’s reply might be a polite expression of
a wholesale disagreement. (This is one possible conversational effect
of Yes, but...) But sometimes B might be objecting to A’s criticism of
hospitality while granting that A is saying something true. (This is an-
other possible conversational effect of Yes, but...) For instance, A and
B might agree that Tweedy generally manifests frugality in his duties
as college master but disagree on whether he shows inadequate hos-
pitality. (11) doesn’t allow the same range of possibilities. When C’s
utterance occurs in a discussion of Tweedy’s job performance, D’s re-
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ply can also sound fine. But D’s reply expresses a negative evaluation
of Tweedy’s dispensation of hospitality and thus agrees with C’s crit-
icism of Tweedy’s job performance. Certain instances of (10) and (11)
may thus exhibit a certain kind of asymmetry.
5. Explanations of Contextual Variability
I’ll now argue that there are many available explanations of the ap-
parent contextual variability in evaluative valence which thick terms
and concepts can manifest in their positive form. Some of these views
have so far been represented in the literature on thick concepts in-
adequately or not at all. My discussion will therefore introduce as a
side effect some new theoretical options into the literature. These ex-
planations have different implications regarding LE. No doubt some
will turn out to be more plausible than others. But the relative merits
of these explanations will be largely independent of their implications
regarding contextual variability. Nothing much about LE will settled
by those considerations. Or so I’ll argue.
5.1 Pragmatic Views
The explanations most commonly favored by those who offer examples
like (6)-(9) locate the evaluations that thick terms and concepts may be
used to convey outside their conventional meaning as some aspect of
the information that speaker-hearers may use them to express, asso-
ciate with their meanings, and glean from their uses, even in literal
uses in normal contexts. That is no surprise: the Variability Argument
is meant to support the conclusion that the relationship between thick
terms and concepts and evaluation is broadly pragmatic. This would
be to say that thick terms and concepts are evaluative only in the weak
sense that they can be used evaluatively.21
21. This is true of many terms that aren’t evaluative in meaning. Calling some-
thing physically strenuous, for instance, can convey a positive evaluation in
some contexts but a negative evaluation in others by means of conversa-
tional implicature. Terms such as selfish and generous might be mere special
cases where evaluations of a particular direction of valence are sufficiently
Regarding (6), a pragmatic hypothesis has resources to explain how
general conversational principles can in some contexts suggest inter-
preting the speaker as implying or suggesting that an overt display of
sexuality would have been the better for it, not the worse for it, had
it transgressed conventional boundaries on sexual display. Regarding
(7), it can allow that whether frugal is used to convey positive or neg-
ative evaluation can depend on context in subtle ways. For instance, it
doesn’t require that any literal use of frugal within any discussion of
college masters or their job performance will convey negative evalua-
tion, but only that some such contexts work this way, these perhaps be-
ing contexts where commonly shared background assumptions favor-
ing generosity in hospitality are salient. (10) and (11) might be thought
to illustrate one potential difference between contexts. If it is manifest
in the context that Tweedy’s performance as master might be deficient
in some way related to low expenditure, this could explain how A’s
utterance in (10) or C’s utterance in (11) can suggest that this is so, and
why B’s reply could be heard as denying this suggestion but D’s reply
be heard as reinforcing it. Regarding (8) and (9), if considerate and cruel
aren’t inherently evaluative in meaning, then there is no deep theoret-
ical problem with understanding how considerate could sometimes be
used literally in a way that suspends the positive evaluations which
are commonly associated with it or even conveys negative evaluation,
or how cruel could in some suitable contexts be used literally to con-
vey positive evaluation. All that is required is that a suitable discourse
situation fall into place.
Pragmatic views of this sort support the Variability Claim. They are
consistent with the Link Claim, but in the foregoing a pragmatic expla-
nation of what is going on in examples like (6)-(11) was run without
the Link Claim.22 Thus pragmatic views on the relationship between
thick terms and concepts and evaluation seem to require only some
deeply entrenched in social norms and cultural context as to be part of their
default interpretation. See Väyrynen (ms1) for discussion.
22. Blackburn (1992) endorses the Link Claim. I would argue that his case for
it relies on a crude view of the semantics/pragmatics interface.
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weaker assumptions about how contextual variability in evaluative va-
lence bears on that relationship.
5.2 Semantic Invariantism
At the other end of the spectrum lie explanations of examples like (6)-
(11) which claim both that the relationship between thick terms and
concepts and evaluation is semantic and that this relationship involves
a fixed direction of evaluation in the literal uses of thick terms and
concepts in normal contexts (Link Claim). This kind of semantic in-
variantism explains away the apparent variability of thick terms and
concepts in evaluative valence as non-literal use or abnormal context.
Its strategy is to challenge the Variability Claim.
The natural way to explain away the appearance of contextual vari-
ability is to invoke the distinction between semantic meaning and
speaker meaning, note that these may come apart, and argue that they
come apart in our examples in a different way than they do according
to pragmatic views on the relationship between thick terms and con-
cepts and evaluation. According to pragmatic views, the evaluations
that thick terms and concepts may be used to convey are always some
aspect of speaker meaning. According to semantic invariantism, one
direction of evaluative valence is semantically fixed but thick terms
and concepts may be used to convey evaluations of different valence
as a matter of speaker meaning.
Regarding (6), the semantic invariantist could say that uttering (6)
isn’t a case of literal use but a way of mocking the sorts of prudish
evaluations which lewd conveys as a matter of meaning.23 Regarding
(7), the explanation of how frugal might be used to convey negative
evaluation would be that when Blackburn condemns Tweedy as fru-
gal, the word frugal in Blackburn’s mouth conveys something positive,
but it is clear in context that he as speaker means something negative.
23. Blackburn suggests that lewd is often used in such cases to mock prudish
sensibilities, although he denies that negative evaluation is semantically
fixed (Blackburn 1992; 1998: 103).
Thus the exchange in (10) could sometimes be read as denying a nega-
tive implicature regarding Tweedy’s hospitality, whereas the exchange
in (11) could sometimes be read as a comment on the negative effect
that the way in which frugality is good has on Tweedy’s dispensation
of hospitality. Similarly, regarding (9), the invariantist could say that
cruel always means something negative as a semantic matter, but it is
clear in context that the speaker means something positive. This might
be because the speaker is a sadist, or because the cruel action was a
response to an unjustified slight which the speaker enjoyed retaliating
against, and so on. (What sort of positive evaluation would be con-
veyed depends on whether fun is used literally or to mean good.) Re-
garding (8), one might say that when a considerate action contingently
manifests the negative quality of assisting an evil purpose, this fact
might be so salient, and considerateness as such so minimally good,
that it would be true but misleading to say that wiping the torturer’s
sweaty brow is good, and instead the salient negative evaluation is
conveyed as a matter of conversational implicature. This would be to
explain (8) by appeal to general conversational principles, such as that
one should make one’s conversational contributions informative and
relevant (Grice 1975).
It is a further question whether the apparent variability in valence
that is exhibited by examples like (6)-(9) is always best explained away
as a pragmatic spin on a semantically fixed direction of evaluation,
although no doubt they sometimes are. Perhaps sometimes consider-
ateness is good in no way, or lewdness bad in no way. Is there a way to
increase the general plausibility of semantic invariantism? (7) and its
variants can be used to suggest one option.
A speaker who condemns Tweedy as frugal needn’t think that he is
a worse person for his frugality, but only a worse college master. One
way to explain this is to say that what is semantically fixed in frugal is
only a positive evaluation of people qua persons. In that case it would
be consistent with the meaning of frugal as a term of positive evaluation
that Tweedy is bad in a role such as college master. That might even be
because of the very features which make him frugal, and thereby good
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in some way, as a person. Apparent contextual variability could then
be explained away by saying that features which make people frugal
may also ground negative evaluations which calling someone frugal
can convey by pragmatic means.24
Semantic invariantism can also allow context to play a role in de-
termining which evaluations are salient: perhaps frugal is semantically
fixed as a term of positive evaluation in contexts where someone is
assessed as a person but has no semantically fixed direction of valence
in contexts where someone is assessed in a specific role such as col-
lege master. Thus, if the relevant comparison class in contexts where
(7) and (10)-(11) are uttered is college masters rather than persons, that
might explain why what is salient in such contexts isn’t the semanti-
cally fixed positive evaluation of Tweedy as a person but rather some
evaluation of Tweedy as master which may (according to this view) be
positive or negative so far as the meaning of frugal goes. And perhaps
other thick terms and concepts exhibit similar behavior.
Semantic invariantist explanations of the apparent contextual vari-
ability of thick terms and concepts in evaluative valence can agree
with the Link Claim. But they support no version of the Variability
Claim which bears on LE in the way that the Variability Argument
requires.25 Essentially similar explanations of apparent variability in
valence might be available to views according to which thick terms
and concepts have a fixed direction of evaluation because evaluation
is related to thick terms and concepts as some such further semantic
property as conventional implicature or semantic presupposition.
5.3 Semantic Contextualism
A different kind of semantic explanation of examples like (6)-(11)
agrees with semantic invariantism that the relationship between thick
24. Thanks to Daniel Elstein (p.c.) for suggesting this kind of view to me.
25. Semantic invariantist explanations seem not to require a preference either
way regarding the issue of (in)separabilism (recall the end of §2).
terms and concepts and evaluation is semantic but claims that the va-
lence of evaluation is context-sensitive rather than invariable. This kind
of semantic contextualism has so far gone largely unnoted in the liter-
ature on thick concepts. But what it allows is precisely that the eval-
uations that thick terms and concepts may be used to convey can be
positive in some contexts but negative in others, and yet be a feature
of their meaning all the same.26 We know that what degree of height
counts as tall or what intensity and duration of a certain sort of quali-
tative experience it takes for a sensation to count as painful may vary
with context. This sort of semantic contextualism claims that what may
vary with context is not only how overt and transgressive of conven-
tional boundaries a sexual display must be to count as lewd but also
whether such display would be bad in some way. It caters similar op-
tions regarding what sort of expenditure counts as frugal and whether
the relevant degree of frugality would be good in some way, what sort
of responsiveness to others counts as considerate and whether it would
be good in some way, what degree of suffering caused to others and
enjoyment taken from causing it counts as cruel and whether that de-
gree of cruelty would be bad in some way, and so on. Thus it would
seem to have resources to explain (6)-(9).
This kind of semantic contextualism has resources to explain (10)
and (11) as well. If A’s utterance in (10) meant that Tweedy is good in
some way related to low expenditure (or something along these lines),
then B’s reply would be understood as preempting the potential im-
plicature that Tweedy’s frugality has had a negative effect on the dis-
pensation hospitality. If C’s utterance in (11) meant the same, D’s reply
would be expected to begin No, ... and be understood as disagreeing
26. A natural version of this view is that the “character” of predicates express-
ing thick terms and concepts is a non-constant function from contexts to
some kind of evaluative contents (cf. Kaplan 1989). The senses of expres-
sions which return different contents in different contexts go with their
character rather than content; standard examples include indexicals like I
and here.
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with the positive evaluation, given the duties of college masters to dis-
pense hospitality. If A’s utterance in (10) meant that Tweedy is frugal
and bad for it, B’s reply would be expected to begin No, ... or else be
understood as agreeing with A’s assessment of Tweedy as frugal but
denying a negative evaluation regarding Tweedy’s dispensation of hos-
pitality. If C’s utterance in (11) meant the same, then D’s reply would
be understood as agreeing with the negative evaluation. Presumably
these also don’t exhaust the range of semantic contents that an utter-
ance of the sentence Tweedy is frugal could have under contextualism.
It is also worth noting that contextualism would seem to have no par-
ticular problem explaining how comparative constructions like too tidy
and not lewd enough work. These constructions may be understood as
effecting the kind of context shift which can also occur in examples
like (5) by supplying a new standard of comparison.
This kind of semantic contextualism portrays the relationship be-
tween thick terms and concepts and evaluation as semantic and yet
as contextually variable in evaluative valence. (What is stable across
literal uses in normal contexts is only the potential of thick terms and
concepts to have evaluative content relative to context.) This is to agree
with the Variability Claim but reject the Link Claim. The Variability
Argument has no bite against this kind of semantic contextualism.
I know of one earlier view that holds that thick terms and con-
cepts are inherently evaluative but accepts the Variability Claim. The
trick is to reject the Link Claim. Jonathan Dancy argues that thick terms
and concepts involve different directions of evaluation in different con-
texts and may even involve multiple evaluations of different valence in
one and the same context. Calling something lewd, for instance, might
typically express something negative, sometimes express that it is just
what is called for, and sometimes express some mixture of the posi-
tive and the negative, such as that it would be appropriate to respond
with some mixture of titillation and embarrassment (Dancy 1995: 265).
Dancy thinks that such variability is built into the very meanings of
thick terms and concepts. As he puts it, “competence with a thick
concept [requires] a general understanding of the range of attitudes
associated with the concept” and its “meaning . . . is the range of dif-
ferences that it can make” to how one should act; its semantic value
relative to context is to be found within that range (Dancy 1995: 270;
2004: 107, 194).27 These are controversial claims about meaning and
conceptual competence, especially if distinctions between the mean-
ing of an expression and other information associated with meaning
needn’t be psychologically significant to ordinary speakers.28 But pre-
sumably they represent only one among many contextualist options.
Much more thus remains to be said about contextualist accounts of the
relationship between thick terms and concepts and evaluation.29 Here
I wish only to flag contextualism as another possible explanation of
apparent contextual variability in evaluative valence.30
The form of semantic contextualism discussed above must be dis-
tinguished from an alternative according to which thick terms and
concepts are context-sensitive with respect to extension without being
context-sensitive with respect to evaluative valence.31 This alternative
treats their context-sensitivity only as an unsurprising special case of
27. Dancy understands his view as inseparabilist: there may be no way to de-
termine just what non-evaluative features of a certain general type some-
thing must have to count as lewd, courageous, or the like, independently
of determining what evaluations of it would be appropriate in the partic-
ular context. But semantic contextualism might also be understood along
separabilist lines: thick terms and concepts have some content that isn’t
context-sensitive and some content that is, and their evaluative contents
relative to contexts are among the latter.
28. For discussion, see e.g. Soames (2010: Ch. 7).
29. One issue here is how what Dancy calls “semantic particularism” relates to
more standard forms of contextualism (Dancy 2004: 194). It could turn out
that semantic particularism isn’t best understood as a version of contextu-
alism after all. (Thanks to Anna Bergqvist here.)
30. When semantic invariantism about some class of sentences has a contex-
tualist rival, typically a relativist alternative is also available. (Examples
include epistemic modals, knowledge attributions, future contingents, and
predicates of personal taste.) I doubt that semantic relativism recommends
itself as an explanation of contextual variability in evaluative valence, but I
have no space to argue this here.
31. See Väyrynen (ms2) for a more extensive discussion of how context-
sensitivity in general and gradability in particular bear on the relationship
between thick terms and concepts and evaluation.
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some already familiar sort of context-sensitivity exhibited by other ex-
pressions. It is familiar, for example, that gradable expressions like tall
and loud are context-sensitive, and many thick terms and concepts are
gradable.32 For instance, selfish might be regarded as context-sensitive
with respect to which preferences for one’s own happiness over just
how much greater a happiness for others counts as selfish. This hy-
pothesis about context-sensitivity is compatible both with views ac-
cording to which thick terms and concepts are inherently evaluative in
meaning and with views that deny this. Variability in evaluative va-
lence would presumably receive a semantic invariantist explanation in
the former case and a broadly pragmatic one in the latter.
The latter form of contextualism might go as follows. First, thick
terms and concepts denote different non-evaluative properties in dif-
ferent contexts. For instance, frugal can be used to measure different
types of expenditure, much as smart can mean book smart or street smart
or large as applied to cities can measure population or geography; all
these expressions may of course denote different degrees of the rel-
evant qualities in different contexts (cf. Glanzberg 2007: 10). Second,
thick terms and concepts hold together evaluation and description in
such a way that in some contexts frugal measures some type of expen-
diture which is commonly associated with a positive evaluation while
in other contexts frugal measures some type of expenditure which is
commonly associated with negative evaluation. Assuming that it is
manifest in context that Tweedy’s dispensation of hospitality should
be generous, the exchange in (10) can be fine if context determines
that frugal measures Tweedy’s general college expenditure, whereas
B’s reply will be infelicitous if frugal measures Tweedy’s hospitality
expenditure in particular. The exchange in (11) sounds fine either way,
but it would sound odd if frugal in that context measured expenditure
in some particular dimension other than hospitality.
This sort of contextualism can go with either semantic or pragmatic
32. The references in note 16 discuss the semantics of gradable expressions.
views on the relationship between thick terms and concepts and eval-
uation, depending on the mechanisms by which the contextually de-
termined measures convey evaluation. It is therefore compatible with
the Variability Claim and the Link Claim but entails neither and hence
doesn’t support the conclusion of the Variability Argument.
5.4 Contextual Enrichment
Another option worth mentioning which has so far gone unnoted in
the literature is to appeal to mechanisms of “free” enrichment in ex-
plaining contextual variability.33 The idea is that context might be rel-
evant to the interpretation of utterances not just by helping to saturate
a slot or variable in the meaning of a sentence (which is typically re-
garded as the site of contextual action for semantic contextualism), but
also by providing additional information which isn’t triggered by any
component of sentence meaning. (12) and (13) are two putative exam-
ples of enriching the interpretation of an utterance in this way:
(12) “I have had supper.” (→ I have had supper tonight.)
(13) “I have nothing to wear.” (→ I have nothing cool to wear for
Emily’s party.)
What happens in enrichment is that an expression is contextually given
a more specific interpretation than it literally encodes.
Enrichment might play a role in some instances of (7) and (10)-
(11). The hypothesis would be that the meaning of frugal builds in
only some fairly general measure of frugality, such as one based on
something like the money spent, but that it is semantically optional
for context to add further information which in turn might matter to
what sort of evaluation is conveyed by calling something frugal.’ A
context in which Tweedy can be condemned as frugal might be a con-
text which specifies that Tweedy’s expenditure is low with respect to
hospitality and that this counts as a bad way for a college master to
33. On free enrichment, see e.g. Recanati (2004: Ch. 2).
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be frugal. But context might instead determine that Tweedy’s expendi-
ture is low except on some specific dimension such as hospitality. And
even if context determines that his expenditure is low on hospitality, it
might also add such information as that Tweedy travels considerable
distance to get a good price on claret and so there is no skimping in
the opportunities to imbibe.34 In such contexts, B’s reply in (10) would
sound just fine, whereas D’s reply in (11) would sound odd. Additional
information might in general be relevant to what sort of evaluation is
conveyed by using a thick term or concept. (Perhaps supplying more
specific information about a cruel or considerate act sometimes leads
to a valence switch.) Mechanisms of enrichment might therefore help
to explain at least some cases of apparent contextual variability in eval-
uative valence. Just how enrichment bears on the relationship between
thick terms and concepts and evaluation depends on what kind of role
the kind of material which enrichment is supposed to provide plays in
semantic interpretation. It is common to regard enrichment as a con-
versational mechanism that makes no contribution to semantic content
relative to context, but the issue is a matter of controversy.
5.5 What Does All This Show?
This survey of explanations of the apparent contextual variability of
thick terms and concepts in evaluative valence makes no claim to com-
prehensiveness. There may well be further options to those covered
here. Nor is this survey meant to provide a critical assessment of the
options that it does cover. No doubt some of them embody more plau-
sible views on the relationship between thick terms and concepts and
evaluation than others.35 There are various questions and concerns to
raise about each explanation which my discussion neither raises nor
aims to raise. This paper is therefore not meant to favor any particular
explanation of the apparent contextual variability of thick terms and
34. Thanks to Michael Glanzberg for this example.
35. I argue that thick terms and concepts are not inherently evaluative in mean-
ing on the basis of different linguistic evidence in Väyrynen (ms1).
concepts with respect to their evaluative valence.
None of these limits in my discussion undermine its point, however.
Its point is a modest one: there are many available explanations of this
apparent variability in valence, but only some of these explanations
support the Variability Argument for pragmatic views on the relation-
ship between thick terms and concepts and evaluation. Some of these
explanations, such as semantic invariantism, challenge the Variability
Claim. Others, such as those contextualist explanations according to
which the relationship between thick terms and concepts and evalu-
ation is semantic and yet contextually variable, undermine the Link
Claim by their mere availability. So long as at least some of these al-
ternatives to pragmatic views remain in the running, considerations
of variability in valence won’t suffice to settle the relationship between
thick terms and concepts and evaluation. Thus linguistic evidence con-
cerning such variability seems not to take us very far in answering LE.
These conclusions represent a null result that may feel disappointingly
thin. But there you have it nonetheless: the relationship between thick
terms and concepts and evaluation must be settled on grounds other
than whether thick terms and concepts are contextually variable with
respect to the valence of the evaluations they may be used to convey.
6. Conclusion
Let me close with a suggestion for a more promising line of research.
Certain types of disagreement involving thick terms and concepts
seem to me to provide a better guide than contextual variability to
both the relationship between thick terms and concepts and evalua-
tion in general and, as a consequence, the plausibility of the Variability
Claim in particular.
One type of apparent disagreement arises when people who apply
thick terms and concepts aren’t disposed to make the same inferential
transitions with respect, for instance, to how it would be appropriate to
react. It can happen that two people call one and the same action brutal
but only one of them infers from this that the action was thereby bad in
some way whereas the other doesn’t. One case of the latter sort of reac-
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tion could be our earlier example (9) (Yes, cruel certainly, but that’s just
what made it such fun). What is going on in these cases is a substantive
issue. One option is that the relevant term (brutal, cruel, etc.) is used
evaluatively by some but descriptively by others. In that case there
would be a ready explanation of the different inferential transitions,
but the disagreement would concern at most what the meaning of the
relevant term is, or should be, and might be merely apparent. Another
option is that one person might fail to draw a negative inference be-
cause her grasp of the concept (brutal, cruel, or whatever) is partial
or defective, or even because he doesn’t grasp the same concept as the
more virtuous people. The moral blindness of a schoolyard bully who
fails to see anything wrong with his behavior could be a case in point.
(Especially in the latter scenario the extent of real disagreement might
depend on the extent of similarity between the different concepts.) A
further option is to explain the difference in inferential transitions in
terms of differences in substantive conceptions of cruelty which the
different speakers associate, perhaps very closely, with their terms or
concepts but are consistent with a shared, univocal term or concept.
Perhaps it is semantically permissible to resist a negative inference be-
cause it is mistaken but not necessarily confused to think that a cruel
response might sometimes be permissible or even merited. In this case
genuine moral disagreement concerning something that is agreed to
be cruel would seem to be semantically possible.36
Only some accounts of this type of disagreement are compatible
with the Variability Claim or, equally, with the claim that thick terms
and concepts are inherently evaluative in meaning. How apparent dis-
agreements of this kind are best explicated therefore bears directly on
the relationship between thick terms and concepts and evaluation.
Another type of apparent disagreement arises when a thick term
or concept is used to convey evaluations that some people regard as
36. This seems to be Hume’s position on “monkish virtues” (Hume 1751/1998:
IX.1). Hume agrees that some things exhibit self-denial and humility, but
argues that the claim that these qualities are virtues is false.
objectionable in the sense that they really ought not to be endorsed.
For instance, lazy and industrious are commonly used to convey, re-
spectively, negative and positive evaluations. Those who don’t value
hard work might well resist applying either term to anything at all
when context is one where an evaluative outlook, such as the Protes-
tant work ethic, which entails those evaluations is widely shared or
otherwise manifest.37 For in such contexts utterances featuring these
terms would convey evaluations rejected by those who find the Protes-
tant work ethic objectionable and thereby mislead others about what
evaluations they accept. Is such resistance best explained by analyzing
thick terms and concepts as inherently evaluative in meaning? Others
might happily apply lazy to more or less the same things as those who
value doing hard work that one is able to do, but mean to convey some-
thing positive. Would they be in a genuine evaluative disagreement,
and therefore share a concept to some significant degree, with those
who endorse the sort of work ethic that lazy and industrious are typi-
cally used to convey? Or would they simply wield different concepts
which happen largely to coincide in (intended) extension? Similarly,
imagine someone who is happily using lazy and industrious but then
stops to smell the flowers, changes one’s mind about the value of hard
work, and yet continues applying these terms to more or less the same
things, but without the evaluations she used to use them to convey.
It is a substantive issue whether such cases must involve a change in
concepts or whether one and the same concept could persist through
such changes in one’s evaluative outlook. In the former case, evalu-
ation could be built into the meanings of lazy and industrious; in the
latter case, evaluation wouldn’t seem to be essential to these concepts.
Only some accounts of this type of disagreement are compatible
with the Variability Claim or, equally, with the claim that thick terms
37. See Hare (1981: 17) on lazy and industrious, Gibbard (1992) and Blackburn
(1992; 1998: 101-2) on lewd and chaste, and (Väyrynen 2009; ms1) and Ek-
lund (forthcoming) for discussion of the general phenomenon and its im-
plications for the nature of thick terms and concepts and their relationship
to evaluation.
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and concepts are inherently evaluative in meaning. How apparent dis-
agreements of this kind are best explicated therefore bears directly on
the relationship between thick terms and concepts and evaluation.
I conclude that analyzing the various sorts of disagreements in
which thick terms and concepts might be centrally featured holds
a much better promise of helping to settle whether thick terms and
concepts are inherently evaluative in meaning than considerations of
contextual variability. Arguments from contextual variability of thick
terms and concepts with respect to their evaluative valence to con-
clusions about the relationship between thick terms and concepts and
evaluation are inconclusive and can be fully expected to remain so.38
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